In this paper we consider the logics L i n obtained from the (n + 1)-valued Lukasiewicz logics Ln+1 by taking the order filter generated by i/n as the set of designated elements. In particular, the conditions of maximality and strong maximality among them are analyzed. We present a very general theorem which provides sufficient conditions for maximality between logics. As a consequence of this theorem it is shown that L i n is maximal w.r.t. CPL whenever n is prime. Concerning strong maximality between the logics L i n (that is, maximality w.r.t. rules instead of axioms), we provide algebraic arguments in order to show that the logics L i n are not strongly maximal w.r.t. CPL, even for n prime. Indeed, in such case, we show there is just one extension between L i n and CPL obtained by adding to L i n a kind of graded explosion rule. Finally, using these results, we show that the logics L i n with n prime and i/n < 1/2 are ideal paraconsistent logics.
i n is maximal w.r.t. CPL whenever n is prime. Concerning strong maximality between the logics L i n (that is, maximality w.r.t. rules instead of axioms), we provide algebraic arguments in order to show that the logics L i n are not strongly maximal w.r.t. CPL, even for n prime. Indeed, in such case, we show there is just one extension between L i n and CPL obtained by adding to L i n a kind of graded explosion rule. Finally, using these results, we show that the logics L i n with n prime and i/n < 1/2 are ideal paraconsistent logics.
Introduction
In this paper we study the notion of maximality and strong maximality among finite-valued propositional logics. Recall the usual notion of maximality found in the literature: a propositional logic L 1 , that is a sublogic of another logic L 2 (in the sense of inclusionship of their consequence relations over the same signature), is called maximal with respect to L 2 if, roughly speaking, L 1 extended with any theorem of L 2 which is not a theorem of L 1 , coincides with L 2 . Similarly, recall the stronger notion of strong maximality following [2, 4, 35] : L 1 is called strongly maximal with respect to L 2 if, roughly speaking again, L 1 extended with a rule of inference valid in L 2 but not a valid in L 1 , coincides with L 2 .
The problem of finding and characterizing maximal sublogics (in both senses) of a given logic has already been addressed in the literature, specially in the context of paraconsistent logics, where being maximal with respect to classical logic is felt as a desirable or ideal feature, c.f. [3, 10] . Indeed, being maximal means that, while still allowing non-trivial inconsistent theories, it retains as much as possible of classical logic.
In the present paper we approach the general problem of characterizing maximality (not necessarily for paraconsistent logics) in two different scenarios. The first one considers a very general class of finite-valued logics, those defined by almost arbitrary finite logical matrices. In such a context, we provide a sufficient condition for a logic to be maximal w.r.t. another one with less truthvalues under very general conditions. This result, inspired on the notion of recovery operators from paraconsistent logics, turns out to be very powerful and encompasses many maximality results scattered in the literature.
The second scenario considers a particular class of finite-valued logics, the class of n-valued Lukasiewicz logics L n and their related logics defined by order filters. We show that these logics, for n being prime, are maximal but not strongly maximal with respect to classical logic. Actually, we show that each of these logics can always be uniquely extended with a sort of explosion inference rule such that the obtained logic is the unique one below classical logic, and hence strongly maximal.
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, we provide in Section 2 a very general condition for a finite matrix logic to be maximal w.r.t. another one with less truth-values, and we analyze in particular the case of 3-valued logics. In the rest of the paper we focus our attention on the class of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics L i n defined by order filters. In Section 3 we identify which of these logics are maximal with respect to classical logic, while in Section 4 we study their status regarding the property of strong maximality. It is in Section 5 where we fully characterize, by algebraic techniques, conditions of strong maximality. Finally, in Section 6 the question of ideal paraconsistent logics (as introduced in [3] ) will be analized in the present framework. Specifically, it will be shown that the logics L i n with n prime and i/n < 1/2 are ideal paraconsistent logics. In addition, the case L 1 3 will be discussed with more detail, and it will be argued that this logic constitutes the 4-valued version of the well-known 3-valued paraconsistent logic J 3 (see [20] ). We finish in Section 7 with some conclusions and prospects of future research.
Maximality and recovery operators
Let us recall the usual notion of maximality of a (standard) logic with respect to another: Definition 1. Let L 1 and L 2 two standard propositional logics defined over the same signature Θ such that L 1 is a proper sublogic of L 2 , i.e. such that ψ if Γ, {σ(ϕ) : σ is a substitution over Θ} L1 ψ. Remark 1. It should be noticed that, according to the above definition, if L 1 is a proper sublogic of L 2 such that they validate the same formulas (that is:
L1 ϕ iff L2 ϕ, for every formula ϕ) then L 1 is maximal w.r.t. L 2 .
In this section, for the class of propositional logics induced by finite logical matrices, we will provide a very general sufficient condition for a logic to be maximal w.r.t. another one (see Theorem 1 below), its proof being inspired in the role played by the so-called recovery operators in paraconsistent and adaptive logics. Recall from [12] (see also [11, 10] ) the definition of the class of paraconsistent logics called Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs): a given logic, say L, is an LFI if it is paraconsistent w.r.t. some negation, say ¬ (that is, there exist formulas α and β such that β does not follows from {α, ¬α} in L). In addition, there is a (primitive of definable) unary connective • in L (called a consistency operator) such that every formula β follows in L from a set of the form{α, ¬α, •α}.
1 If L is an LFI which is sublogic of classical propositional logic (CPL), presented in the same signature of L, 2 then the consistency operator • allows to recover CPL inside L by adding additional hypothesis concerning the consistency (or 'classicality', or 'well-behavior') of some formulas. Namely, for every (finite) set Γ ∪ {ψ} of formulas,
where Λ is a set of formulas. This is what is called a Derivability Adjustment Theorem (DAT). The idea of DATs was proposed by Battens in the context of Adaptive logics, but this technique (as well as the notion of consistency operator) was already used by da Costa for his well-known hierarchy of paraconsistent systems C n (see [18] ).
A more interesting DAT (as, for instance, the ones obtained by da Costa) requires that the consistency (or well-behavior) operator • can just be applied to the propositional variables occurring in Γ ∪ {ψ}. This suggests that, given two standard propositional logics L 1 and L 2 defined over the same signature Θ such that L1 ⊆ L2 , a DAT between both logics can be defined in terms of a recovery operator • (generalizing the idea of LFIs): for every (finite) Γ ∪ {ψ},
where {p 1 , . . . , p m } is the set of propositional variables occurring in Γ ∪ {ψ}.
The idea then is that if one of such recovery operators • ϕ can be defined as a family of instances of a theorem ϕ of L 2 which is not derivable in L 1 , and if this process can be reproduced for any of such formulas ϕ, then it will follow that L 2 is maximal w.r.t. L 1 . To be more general, a finite recovery set (p) of formulas depending only on one variable p will be considered instead of a single formula •(p), following the original definition of LFIs. Actually, in Theorem 1 below some sufficient conditions are given in order to define such recovery sets, which will allow us to determine if one logic is maximal w.r.t. another.
In what follows, L(Θ) will denote the term algebra generated by a propositional signature Θ from a fixed set P = {p n : n ≥ 1} of propositional variables. If A is an algebra over Θ then the set of homomorphisms from L(Θ) to A will be denoted by Hom(L(Θ), A).
Given an algebra A over Θ and a non-empty subset F ⊆ A, the pair A, F is called a logical matrix [39] . The logic L defined by the matrix A, F over L(Θ) is given by the following consequence relation: for every set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L(Θ),
From now on, with no danger of confusion, given a logical matrix A, F we will write L = A, F to refer to the corresponding induced logic defined as above. We will also use the term matrix logic to refer a logic defined by a logical matrix. Lemma 1. Let L 1 = A 1 , F 1 and L 2 = A 2 , F 2 be two matrix logics defined over a signature Θ such that A 2 is a subalgebra of A 1 and
After this previous lemma, we can state the main result on this section. Theorem 1. Let L 1 = A 1 , F 1 and L 2 = A 2 , F 2 be two distinct finite matrix logics over a same signature Θ such that A 2 is a subalgebra of A 1 and F 2 = F 1 ∩ A 2 . Assume the following:
. . , a n } and A 2 = {0, 1, a 1 , . . . , a k } are finite such that 0 ∈ F 1 , 1 ∈ F 2 and {0, 1} is a subalgebra of A 2 .
2. There are formulas (p) and ⊥(p) in L(Θ) depending at most on one variable p such that e( (p)) = 1 and e(⊥(p)) = 0, for every evaluation e for L 1 .
3. For every k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n (with i = j) there exists a formula α i j (p) in L(Θ) depending at most on one variable p such that, for every evaluation e, e(α
Proof. Let us begin by observing that the family of evaluations for L 1 which take values in A 2 for every propositional variable can be identified with the family of evaluations for L 2 .
3
Notice that, by Lemma 1, L1 ⊆ L2 . Suppose that there is some formula ϕ(p 1 , . . . , p m ) such that L2 ϕ but L1 ϕ (otherwise the proof is done, by Remark 1). Then, e(ϕ) ∈ F 2 for every evaluation e ∈ Hom(L(Θ), A 2 ), but there is an homomorphism e 0 ∈ Hom(L(Θ), A 1 ) such that e 0 (ϕ) ∈ F 1 . By the observation at the beginning of the proof (and by considering that F 2 ⊆ F 1 ), there exists a propositional variable p i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ m) such that e 0 (p i ) ∈ A 2 . Consider now a substitution σ 0 such that
and let γ(p 1 , . . . , p n ) = σ 0 (ϕ). Observe that some of the variables p j may not appear in γ, but at least one variable p j (with k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n) must occur in γ, by the hypothesis over e 0 . Now we can state two immediate facts:
Proof: follows from the observation at the beginning of the proof, and by noting that γ is an instance of a tautology of L 2 .
Fact 2:
Given an evaluation e for L 1 , if e(p j ) = a j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n then e(γ) = e 0 (ϕ) ∈ F 1 .
Proof: Observe that, from the hypothesis, it follows that e(σ 0 (p i )) = e 0 (p i ) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Now, for any propositional variable p, let α j j (p) = p for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and let (p) be the finite set of formulas
Let e be an evaluation in L 1 . Observe the following: (i) If e(p) ∈ A 2 then e(α for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then e (γ) = e(γ(α i 1 (p), . . . , α i n (p))). But, by Fact 2, e (γ) = e 0 (ϕ) / ∈ F 1 and so e(γ(α
Finally, let L + 1 be the logic obtained from L 1 by adding ϕ (and all of its instances) as a theorem. As observed above,
Fact 3: Let Γ ∪ {ψ} be a finite a set of formulas in L(Θ) depending on the variables p 1 , . . . , p t . Then
Proof: Assume that Γ L2 ψ and let e ∈ Hom(L(Θ),
Conversely, assume that Γ, (p 1 ), . . . , (p t ) L1 ψ and consider an evaluationē ∈ Hom(L(Θ), A 2 ) such thatē[Γ] ⊆ F 2 . Define an evaluation e ∈ Hom(L(Θ), A 1 ) such that e(p) =ē(p) for every variable p. Then e(β) =ē(β) for every β in L(Θ) and so e[Γ] ⊆ F 1 and also e[ (p i )] ⊆ F 1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ t, by ( * ). By hypothesis, e(ψ) ∈ F 1 and thenē(ψ) ∈ F 1 ∩ A 2 , that is,ē(ψ) ∈ F 2 . This shows that Γ L2 ψ, proving Fact 3.
Consider now a finite a set of formulas Γ ∪ {ψ} in L(Θ) depending on the variables p 1 , . . . , p t . Suppose that Γ L2 ψ. Then Γ, (p 1 ), . . . , (p t ) L1 ψ, by Fact 3. But the latter implies that Γ, {σ(ϕ) : σ is a substitution in L(Θ)} L1 ψ, because each (p i ) is a set of instances of ϕ. From this, it follows that Γ L In the next example we show an application of Theorem 1 in order to prove some maximality conditions for two logics related to the well-known 4-valued logic FOUR introduced by Belnap and Dunn [21, 5, 6] . 
Much later, De and Omori considered in [19] the expansion BD ∼ of BD by adding the strong negation ∼, given by the following table:
On the other hand, before Belnap and Dunn's investigations, L. Monteiro already considered in 1963 (see [33] ) the 4-valued algebra M 4m obtained from M 4 by adding a modal operator defined as follows:
This led to A. Monteiro to consider the variety TMA of tetravalent modal algebras, which is the one generated by M 4m (cf. [28] ). As proven by Font and Rius in [23] , the (degree-preserving) logic of TMA is characterized by the matrix logic M B = M 4m , {B, 1} . Previous to [19] and with a different motivation, Coniglio and Figallo define in [16] 
, {B, 1} , the expansion of M B with the strong negation ∼ described above, characterizing the (degreepreserving) logic of the variety generated by M ∼ 4m (which was independently introduced by A. Monteiro in [32] and by G. Moisil in [31] .) By using Theorem 1, it is easy to show that both M ∼ B and BD ∼ are maximal relative to CPL presented in the signature Θ = {∧, ∨, ¬ ∼, } and Θ = {∧, ∨, ¬ ∼} over the two-element Boolean algebra B 2 , respectively (where p is equivalent to p and ¬p is equivalent to ∼p). Indeed, observe that B 2 (expanded by ∼ and ) is a subalgebra of M ∼ 4m , and (p) = p ∨ ∼p and ⊥(p) = p ∧ ∼p are as required. Notice that, since there are in M 4 just two values besides the 'classical' ones, namely a 1 = N and a 2 = B, the formulas α
Therefore, it follows from Theorem 1 that M ∼ B is maximal reative to CPL presented over the signature Θ. Similarly, it also follows that BD ∼ is maximal relative to CPL presented over the signature Θ (the latter corresponding to [19, Theorem 3] ).
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 1, it follows that any 3-valued logic which extends CPL and it can express the top and the bottom formulas, is maximal w.r.t. CPL. Corollary 1. Let A 1 be an algebra defined over a signature Θ with domain A 1 = {0, 1/2, 1}, and consider the matrix logic L 1 = A 1 , F 1 where 0 ∈ F 1 and 1 ∈ F 1 . Further, let A 2 be a subalgebra of A 1 , with A 2 = {0, 1}, and assume that the matrix logic L 2 = A 2 , {1} is a presentation of classical propositional logic CPL over signature Θ such that L 2 is distinct from L 1 . Suppose additionally there are formulas (p) and ⊥(p) in L(Θ) on one variable p such that e( (p)) = 1 and e(⊥(p)) = 0, for every evaluation e for L 1 . Then, L 1 is maximal w.r.t. CPL (presented as L 2 ).
Proof. Observe that L 1 and L 2 are matrix logics as in Lemma 1, since {1} = F 1 ∩A 2 . Given that A 1 contains just one element out of {0, 1}, namely a 1 = 1/2, then Theorem 1 can be applied (since requirement (3) is satisfied by vacuity). As a consequence of Theorem 1, L 1 is maximal w.r.t. CPL (presented as L 2 ).
In the next example some instances of Corollary 1 are analyzed, showing the strength of this result: indeed, several well-known 3-valued logics which are known to be maximal w.r.t. CPL fall inside the scope of Corollary 1. CPL. In order to illustrate this fact consider by instance ϕ(p 1 ) = p 1 ∨ ¬p 1 := (p 1 → ¬p 1 ) → ¬p 1 , a formula which is valid in CPL but it is not valid in L 3 . Indeed, any evaluation e 0 in L 3 where e 0 (p 1 ) = 1/2 is such that e 0 (ϕ) = 1/2, a non-designated truth-value. By following the construction described in the proof of Theorem 1 (where α 1 1 (p) = p), it follows that γ(p 1 ) = ϕ(p 1 ), and so •(p) = p ∨ ¬p is a recovery operator for L 3 w.r.t. CPL defined in terms of ϕ.
Thus, L 3 plus ϕ coincides with CPL. Notice that the truth-table of the recovery operator • is as follows:
As it is well known, the matrices of L 3 are functionally equivalent to that of the 3-valued paraconsistent logic J 3 , introduced by da Costa and D'Ottaviano, see [20] . This means that L 
2 with e 0 (p 1 ) = 1/2 is such that e 0 (ϕ) = 0. Then, by the proof of Theorem 1 (where α 
In an unpublished draft, J. Marcos [29] (see also [11, Section 5.3] ) proposes a family of 8,192 logics which are 3-valued and paraconsistent, belonging to the hierarchy of LFIs. Among these logics, there is J 3 (whose truth-tables can define the matrices of all the other logics in the family) and Sette's logic P 1 (see [37] ), whose truth-tables are definable by the matrices of any of the logics in the family. All these logics are maximal w.r.t. CPL presented in the signature {∧, ∨, →, ¬, •} such that •ϕ is valid for every ϕ (that is, algebraically, •(x) = 1 for all x ∈ {0, 1}). The proof of maximality of all these logics w.r.t. CPL follows easily from Corollary 1 by taking (p) = p → p and
Let I 1 be the 3-valued paracomplete logic introduced by A.M. Sette and W.A. Carnielli in [38] . It is defined over Θ = {→, ¬} with domain {0, 1/2, 1} and designated value 1, and whose operations are given by the tables below.
Once again, the maximality of I 1 w.r.t. CPL follows from Corollary 1 by taking (p) = p → p and ⊥(p) = ¬(p → p). Together with this, they presented a family M n+2 of (n + 2)-valued matrix logics (with n ≥ 2) which are ideal paraconsistent (and so, from the very definition, they are also maximal w.r.t. CPL, see Definition 4 in Section 6). The fact that all these logics are maximal w.r.t. CPL (as proved in [3] ) can also be proved by applying Theorem 1, as it will be shown in what follows.
Given n ≥ 2 consider the algebras A n+2 over the signature Θ = {¬, , ⊃} with domain A n+2 = {0, 1, a 1 , . . . , a n } such that the operations are defined as follows: ¬0 = 1, ¬1 = 0 and ¬x = x otherwise; 0 = 1, 1 = 0, a i = a i+1 if i < n and a n = a 1 ; x ⊃ y = 1 if x / ∈ D = {1, a 1 } and x ⊃ y = y otherwise. The logic M n+2 is defined by the logical matrix A n+2 , D for every n ≥ 2. Let us see that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied for every logic M n+2 w.r.t. CPL. It is easy to see that {0, 1} is a subalgebra of A n+2 and so, by Lemma 1, M n+2 is a sublogic of CPL presented in the signature Θ in which coincides with negation and 1 is the designated value. In addition, it is easy to see that, given a propositional variable p, the formulas (p) = (p ⊃ p) ⊃ (p ⊃ p) and ⊥(p) = ¬ (p) are such that e( (p)) = 1 and e(⊥(p)) = 0, for every evaluation e. Consider now the formulas α
An easy computation shows that e(α i j (p)) = a j if e(p) = a i , for every i = j. Therefore, the conditions of Theorem 1 are fullfilled and so each logic M n+2 is maximal w.r.t. CPL.
The question of ideal paraconsistent logics in the present framework will be treated again in Section 6.
The examples given above show the value of Theorem 1 in order to state maximality of logics under certain hypothesis concerning the expressive power of the given logics. Indeed, several proofs of maximality found in the literature can be easily obtained as a consequence of Theorem 1: for instance, the ones given for the 3-valued paraconsistent logic P 1 in [37, Proposition 11], for the 3-valued logic I 1 in [38, Proposition 17] and for J 3 (formulated as the equivalent logic LFI1) in [13, Theorem 4.6], respectively. It is worth noting that all the examples of maximality of a logic L 1 w.r.t. another logic L 2 given in this section, as well as the examples to be given in the rest of the paper, are non-vacuous in the sense of Remark 1. Indeed, in all the examples of maximality presented here the set of theorems of L 1 is strictly contained in the set of theorems of L 2 , thus the notion of maximality holds in a non-trivial way. For instance, the formula p → •p is a theorem of CPL which does not hold in any of the logics presented in Example 2(3), while the formula p → ¬ p is a theorem of CPL which does not hold in any of the systems M n+2 presented in Example 3. On the other hand, it should be observed that the set of designated values may not play a relevant role with respect to maximality, for instance, when analyzing maximality with respect to CPL (recall e.g. Corollary 1 or see Proposition 2 in next section).
As observed above, Theorem 1 cannot be applied to logics which do not have enough expressive power, as seen in Examples 2(5) for Gödel's logics G n (with n ≥ 4). This is not the case for finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics, as it will be shown in the next section.
Maximality between finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics induced by order filters
In the rest of the paper we will deal with matrix logics based on the family of finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics L n with n ≥ 2. The (n + 1)-valued Lukasiewicz logic can be semantically defined as the matrix logic
where
n , 1 , and the operations are defined as follows: for every x, y ∈ LV n+1 ,
The following operations can be defined in every algebra LV n+1 :
Observe that L 2 is the usual presentation of classical propositional logic CPL as a matrix logic over the two-element Boolean algebra B 2 with domain {0, 1} with signature {¬, →}.
The logics L n can also be presented as Hilbert calculi that are axiomatic extensions of the infinite-valued Lukasiewicz logic L ∞ . Recall that L ∞ is algebraizable and the class M V of all MV-algebras is its equivalent quasivariety semantics [36, 14] . Since algebraizability is preserved by finitary extensions then every finite valued Lukasiewicz logic L n is also algebraizable, and we will denote by M V n its corresponding subvariety of algebras.
In this section, finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics with a set of designated values possibly different to {1} will be studied from the point of view of maximality. First, some notation will be introduced.
For every i ≥ 1 and for every x ∈ LV n+1 , ix will stand for x ⊕ · · · ⊕ x (i-times), while x i will stand for x ⊗ · · · ⊗ x (i-times). For 1 ≤ i ≤ n let
be the order filter generated by i/n, and let
be the corresponding matrix logic. From now on, the consequence relation of
It is interesting to notice that some of these logics are paraconsistent, and some are not. Indeed, it is easy to prove the following characterization.
Thus, for instance, for n = 5 it follows that L m whenever m|n (taking into account that LV m+1 is a subalgebra of LV n+1 iff m|n). In particular, the maximality of certain instances of L i n w.r.t. CPL can be obtained by using Theorem 1.
The following examples deal with the algebras LV n which, as observed above, can define a meet operator ∧ such that, for any order filter F , (a ∧ b) ∈ F iff a, b ∈ F . Because of this, a recovery operator •(p) will be considered instead of a recovery set (p), consisting of the conjunction of all of its members. . From Komori's characterization of axiomatic extensions of (infinite-valued) Lukasiewicz logic L ∞ [27] , it directly follows that the logic L n+1 is maximal w.r.t. CPL iff n is a prime number. By adapting our previous arguments, we can obtain the following extension of this classical result for logics matrix logics over LV n+1 with (almost) arbitrary filters. Proposition 2. Let n ≥ 2 and ∅ = F ⊆ LV n+1 . Then, the logic L = LV n+1 , F is maximal w.r.t. CPL provided that 0 / ∈ F and n is a prime number.
Observe that, as a direct consequence, all the logics L 
(p⊗p)⊕(p⊗p). In order to see this, consider an evaluation e such that e(p) = 1/3; then e((p ⊗ p) ⊕ (p ⊗ p)) = 0.
Next examples exploit the fact that L n+1 is a sublogic of L m+1 iff m divides n, considering additional filters as designated values, and obtaining maximality in some cases.
Example 5. Now, the logics asociated to the algebra LV 5 will be analyzed. 
Example 6. Consider now the case of LV 7 . Since 2 and 3 divide 6, it follows that LV 3 and LV 4 are subalgebras of LV 7 and so L = LV 7 , F is a sublogic of both LV 3 , F ∩ LV 3 and LV 4 , F ∩ LV 4 for any non-trivial filter F of LV 7 . However, it is not possible to prove the maximality of L by applying Theorem 1 since, for every formula α(p) and every evaluation e in LV 7 , e(α(p)) = 1/2 if e(p) ∈ {1/3, 2/3} (since LV 4 is a subalgebra), while e(α(p)) / ∈ {1/3, 2/3} if e(p) = 1/2 (since LV 3 is a subalgebra).
As another example of application of Theorem 1, we can obtain the following maximality condition of a logic L i n with respect to a logic L i/n m .
if the following condition holds: there is some prime number q and k ≥ 1 such that n = q k , and m = q k−1 .
Proof. We recall that LV n+1 is singly generated by any element 0 < l n < 1 such that l and n are mutually prime [24, Lemma 1.2]. Then, since q is prime, LV q k +1 LV q k−1 +1 = {0 < r q k < 1 : r and q are mutually prime} and therefore all conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
4 On strong maximality and explosion rules in the logics L i q Along this section q will denote a prime number.
In the previous section we have seen that all the logics of the form L i q = LV q+1 , F i/q are maximal w.r.t. CPL. However, there are maximal logics that are not maximal w.r.t. CPL in an stronger sense, as firstly considered in [4, 3] in the context of paraconsistent logics, or in [35] in a more general context of belief revision techniques for change of logics.
Definition 2. Let L 1 and L 2 two standard propositional logics defined over the same signature Θ such that L 1 is a proper sublogic of L 2 , i.e. such that L1 L2 . Then, L 1 is said to be strongly maximal w.r.t. L 2 if, for every finitary rule ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n /ψ over Θ, if ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n L2 ψ but ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n L1 ψ, then the logic L * 1 obtained from L 1 by adding ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n /ψ as structural rule, coincides with L 2 .
By L * 1 above we mean the logic whose consequence relation L * 1 is the minimal extension of L1 such that σ(ϕ 1 ), . . . , σ(ϕ n ) L * 1 σ(ψ) for any substitution σ over Θ (see e.g. [39, 3] ).
For instance, as observed in [19, Remark 14] , the logic BD ∼ introduced in Section 2, that is maximal w.r.t. CPL, it is not strongly maximal relative to CPL. Thus, a natural question is whether a given logic is strongly maximal w.r.t. another logic. In particular, in this section, we are interested in studying the status of the logics L i q = LV q+1 , F i/q with q prime in relation to the notion of strong maximality w.r.t. CPL. We will show that the answer is negative, as each of them admits a proper extension by a finitary rule related to the explosion law w.r.t. Lukasiewicz negation. In fact, in Section 5.2 it will be shown that such proper extensions are strongly maximal w.r.t. CPL. (the degree-preserving counterpart of L q+1 ) by adding additional inference rules. The negative feature of such approach is that these Hilbert calculi have "global" inference rules, that is, inference rules such that one of its permises need to be a theorem of L q+1 . By a general result by Blok and Pigozzi (see Theorem 4.3 in [8] ) and from Theorem 2 in Section 5 below, a standard Hilbert calculus for L i q (for i < q) can be obtained from the usual one for L= L q+1 by means of translations. That is, such calculi have no "global" inference rules. The negative side of this approach is that the resulting axiomatization is obtained by translating connectives from the other logic, and so the resulting calculus can appear as very artificial. As an alternative, it seems that a direct method for defining a sound and complete "more natural" Hilbert calculus for each L i q over a suitable signature can also be obtained by means of a 'separation' technique for the truth-values, similar to the one used in Subection 6.2 to define an alternative axiomatization for L Lemma 2. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x ∈ LV n+1 : ix < i/n iff x = 0. Thus, e(iα) < i/n iff e(α) = 0 for every evaluation e in LV n+1 and every formula α.
From now on, ⊥ will denote any formula of the form ¬(p → p), for a propositional variable p. Observe that e(⊥) = 0 for every evaluation in LV n+1 , every n ≥ 1 and every propositional variable p. This is why the choice of p is inessential for a concrete construction of ⊥.
Consider, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, the i-explosion law
It is not hard to prove that this rule is not derivable in any H i q , the sound and complete Hilbert calculus given for the logic L However, the i-explosion rule is clearly admissible in H i q since it is a passive rule, that is: for no instance of the (exp i ) rule, the premisse can be a theorem of H i q . Indeed, for any classical evaluation over {0, 1} it is the case that e(ϕ) ∈ {0, 1} for every formula ϕ and so e(i(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)) < i/n, by Lemma 2. This leads us to consider the following definition. 
such that LV 2 is the two-element Boolean algebra B 2 with domain {0, 1}.
5 Translations, equivalent logics and strong maximality
Preliminaries
Blok and Pigozzi introduce the notion of equivalent deductive systems in [8] (see also [9] ). Two propositional deductive systems S 1 and S 2 in the same language L are equivalent iff there are two translations τ 1 , τ 2 (finite subsets of L-propositional formulas in one variable) such that:
• ψ S2 τ 1 (τ 2 (ψ)). From very general results stated in [8] it follows that two equivalent logic systems are indistinguishable from the point of view of algebra, provided that one of them is algebraizable. Indeed, in such case if one of the systems is algebraizable then the other will be also algebraizable w.r.t. the same quasivariety. By applying this fact to the systems of the form L i n studied in the previous sections, several results on relative maximality between these systems and classical logic will be obtained in the next Subsection 5.2. Actually, these results will be generalized in Subsection 5.3 to obtain relative maximality results among the systems L i n . However, for the sake of self containment, we prefer to leave the results of Subsection 5.2 with their simpler proofs as well.
In the rest of this subsection, we provide the necessary preliminaries that will be needed in the subsequent subsections.
We recall that L ∞ is algebraizable and the class M V of all MV-algebras is its equivalent quasivariety semantics [36, 14] . Since algebraizability is preserved by finitary extensions then every finite valued Lukasiewicz logic is also algebraizable. Now we can prove that the deductive systems L Lemma 3. The restrictions of the λ i,m and λ n,n functions on LV n+1 are the characteristic functions of the order filters F i/n and F 1 respectively, i.e. for each a ∈ LV n+1 ,
Theorem 2. For every n ≥ 2 and every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, L i n and L j n are equivalent deductive systems.
Proof. It is enough to prove that for every 1
Let the translations τ and σ be given by τ = {λ i,n (p)} and σ = {λ n,n (p)}. It is easy to check that for every set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Thus, L 
is an algebraizable logic with the class M V n = Q( LV n+1 ), the quasivariety generated by LV n+1 , as its equivalent variety semantics. It follows from the previous theorem and from [8] that L i n , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is also algebraizable with the same class of M V n -algebras as its equivalent variety semantics. Thus, the lattices of all finitary extensions of L i n are isomorphic, and in fact, dually isomorphic to the lattice of all subquasivarieties of M V n , for all 0 < i < n.
Therefore maximality conditions in the lattice of finitary (axiomatic) extensions correspond to minimality conditions in the lattice of subquasivarieties (subvarieties). Thus, given two finitary extensions L 1 and L 2 of a given logic L i n , where K L1 and K L2 are its associated M V n -quasivarieties, L 1 is strongly maximal with respect L 2 iff K L1 is a minimal subquasivariety of M V n among those M V n -quasivarieties properly containing K L2 . Moreover, if L 1 and L 2 are axiomatic extensions of L i n , then K L1 and K L2 are indeed M V n -varieties. In that case, L 1 is maximal with respect L 2 iff K L1 is a minimal subvariety of M V n among those M V n -varieties properly containing K L2 .
All the axiomatic extensions of L ∞ are characterized by Komori in [27] , where it is shown that every axiomatic extension is finitely axiomatizable and depends only on two finite sets of natural numbers I, J not both empty. Moreover, Panti proved in [34] that every axiomatic extension can be axiomatized relative to L ∞ by a single axiom γ I,J with a single propositional variable. For the case of finite valued Lukasiewicz logics, Komori's characterization depends on just a finite set of natural numbers in the following sense: given n > 1, every axiomatic extension of L n+1 is of the form The lattice of all axiomatic extensions L ∞ is fully described also by Komori in [27] , thus from the equivalence of Theorem 2, we can obtain the following maximality conditions for all axiomatic extensions of L i n .
q k+1 for some prime number q with q|n and a natural k ≥ 0 such that q k |m and q k+1 | m.
Proof. Using the equivalence of Theorem 2 we obtain that the lattice of axiomatic extensions of L i n is isomorphic to the lattice of axiomatic extensions of L n+1 . As mentioned above, every axiomatic extension of L n+1 is characterized by a finite set {m 1 , . . . , m k } where all of its elements are divisors of n. Given two such sets {m 1 , . . . , m k } and {n 1 , . . . , n s }, we define the following relation among finite subsets of divisors of n: {m 1 , . . . , m k } {n 1 , . . . , n s } iff for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k there is 1 ≤ j ≤ s such that m i |n j . This relation is the dual order of the lattice of axiomatic extensions of L n+1 in the following sense: As a corollary we obtain that the suficient condition of Proposition 3 is also necessary.
, F i/n ∩ LV m+1 if and only if there is some prime number q and k ≥ 1 such that n = q k , and m = q k−1 .
The task of fully describing the lattice of all all finitary extensions of L ∞ , isomorphic to the lattice of all subquasivarieties of M V , turns to be an heroic task since the class of all MV-algebras is Q-universal (see [1] ). For the finite valued case it is much simpler, since M V n is a locally finite discriminator variety (cf. [7, 25] ). Any locally finite quasivariety is generated by its critical algebras (see [22] ), where an algebra A is said to be critical iff it is a finite algebra not belonging to the quasivariety generated by all its proper subalgebras. A description of all critical MV-algebras can be found in [25] .
Theorem 4. [25, Theorem 2.5] An MV-algebra A is critical if and only if
A is isomorphic to a finite MV-algebra LV n0+1 × · · · × LV n l−1 +1 satisfying the following conditions:
1. For every i, j < l, i = j implies n i = n j .
2. If there exists n j , j < l such that n i |n j for some i = j, then n j is unique.
Moreover the following result characterizes the inclusion among locally finite quasivarieties.
: j ∈ J} be two finite families of critical MV-algebras. Then it holds that
Q(F) ⊆ Q(G)
if, and only if, for every i ∈ I there exists a non-empty H ⊆ J such that:
1. For any 1 ≤ k ≤ l(i) there are j ∈ H and 1 ≤ r ≤ l(j) such that n ik |m jr .
2. For any j ∈ H and 1 ≤ r ≤ l(j) there exists 1 ≤ k ≤ l(i) such that n ik |m jr .
Strong maximality among logics
L i q ,L i q ,
and classical logic
As a direct application of Lemma 4, we have the following particular case that will be used later.
Corollary 5. Consider the following two sets of one critical MV-algebra each: {LV q+1 × LV 2 } and {LV k+1 }, where q is a prime number such that q > 1.
if and only if q|k.
Proof. The two families of critical algebras above correspond in Lemma 4 to take I = {1} and J = {1}, with n 11 = q, n 12 = 1, m 11 = k. Then one can check that these values satisfy the two conditions of the lemma only in the case that q|k.
Now, for any k > 1, we are able to provide a full description of the minimal subquasivarieties of M V k = Q(LV k+1 ) strictly containing the variety of Boolean algebras.
Theorem 5. Let k > 1. The set of all minimal subquasivarieties of M V k = Q(LV k+1 ) among those strictly containing the class of all the Boolean algebras
Proof. By Lemma 4 and the previous Corollary 5, every K ∈ M k is a subquasivariety of Q(LV k+1 ) strictly containing B. Moreover, for every
On the other hand, let K be a minimal subquasivariety of Q(LV k+1 ) strictly containing B. Since K = B, it must contain a critical algebra C that, by Theorem 4, it must be such that C ∼ = LV m1+1 × · · · × LV ms+1 , where m i |k for every 1 ≤ i ≤ s, and m j > 1 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ s. Hence, for every prime number q such that q|m j , and hence q|k, we have LV q+1 × LV 2 ∈ Q(C) ⊆ K, and thus Q(LV q+1 × LV 2 ) ⊆ K. Since we are assuming the minimality of K, it must be Q(LV q+1 × LV 2 ) = K. Theorem 6. If q > 0 is a prime number, then Q(LV q+1 × LV 2 ) is axiomatized by the MV quasi-identities plus:
Proof. It is easy to check that LV q+1 × LV 2 satisfies these two quasi-identities. Since the MV-identities and γ q (x) ≈ 1 axiomatize V(LV q+1 ), and V(LV q+1 ) is a locally finite quasivariety, it is enough to prove that every critical MV-algebra C ∈ V(LV q+1 ) where the quasi-equation q(x ∧ ¬x) ≈ 1 ⇒ y ∨ ¬y ≈ 1 holds, belongs to Q(LV q+1 × LV 2 ).
Let C be a critical MV-algebra satisfying the axiomatization, then C is such that C ∼ = LV m1+1 × · · · × LV m k +1 satisfying conditions of Theorem 4. Moreover, every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is such that either m i = 1 or m i = q because LV mi+1 belongs to V(LV q+1 ). If there is c ∈ C such that q(c ∧ ¬c) = 1 then, by the second quasi-equation of the above axiomatization, b ∨ ¬b ≈ 1 for any b ∈ C. Thus we have C ∈ B ⊆ Q(LV q+1
Above, note that the identity y ∨ ¬y ≈ 1 corresponds to the previously mentioned Panti's axiom γ I,J (y), with I = {1} and J = ∅, axiomatizing CPL as an axiomatic extension of L n+1 for any n > 1.
Finally, we obtain the following characterization result about strong maximality of logicsL j q with respect to classical logic. Theorem 7. Let q > 1 be a prime number. Then, for every j such that 0 < j ≤ q:
•L j q is strongly maximal with respect to CPL and it is axiomatized by H j q plus the rule j(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)/(ψ ∨ ¬ψ) q .
• L j q is strongly maximal w.r.t.L q exactly corresponds to the explosion rule (exp j ) introduced in Section 4. Indeed, the rule j(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)/(ψ ∨ ¬ψ) q is clearly derivable from (exp j ). On the other hand, assuming j(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), by this rule it follows that (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) q for every ψ. Hence the logic becomes CPL because the translation of the classical axiom ψ ∨ ¬ψ is precisely (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) q , and thus ⊥ follows from j(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ). This does not come as a surprise, since as we have proved above, L j q is strongly maximal w.r.t.L j q and so the latter is the only proper extension of L j q (with a finitary rule) properly contained in CPL.
As a corollary of the previous remark, it follows the completeness of H 
q prime, q|k, q r |n and q r+1 | n}.
Proof. By Lemma 4, every K ∈ M nk n is a subquasivariety of Q(LV nk+1 ) strictly containing Q(LV n+1 ). Moreover, for every
Let K be a minimal subquasivariety of Q(LV nk+1 ) strictly containing Q(LV n+1 ). Trivially, LV n+1 ∈ K. Since K = Q(LV n+1 ), then it must contain a critical algebra C ∼ = LV m1+1 × · · · × LV ms+1 such that m i |nk for every 1 ≤ i ≤ s and m j | n for some 1 ≤ j ≤ s. If there is a prime number q|m j such that q | n, then LV q+1 × LV 2 ∈ Q(C) ⊆ K. Otherwise, there is a prime q such that q|m j and q r |n, and for some r ≥ 1, q r+1 |n and q r+1 |m j , whence LV q r+1 +1 × LV 2 ∈ Q(C) ⊆ K. Thus, in both cases K contains some K i ∈ M nk n , from which it follows that K ∈ M nk n since we are assuming minimality of K.
Theorem 9. For every n > 0.
• If q is a prime number such that q | n, then Q({LV n+1 , LV q+1 × LV 2 }) is axiomatized by the MV identities plus
• If q is a prime number such that q r |n and q r+1 | n, Q({LV n+1 , LV q r+1 +1 × LV 2 }) is axiomatized by the MV identities plus
Proof. We prove the first item, the other is proved in a analogous way. It is easy to check that LV n+1 and LV q+1 × LV 2 satisfy all the quasi-identities. Since the MV-identities with γ {n,q},∅ (x) ≈ 1 axiomatize V({LV n+1 , LV q+1 }) and V({LV n+1 , LV q+1 }) is a locally finite quasivariety, it is enough to prove that every critical MV-algebra C ∈ V({LV n+1 , LV q+1 }) where the quasiequation nq(x ∧ ¬x) ≈ 1 ⇒ γ {n},∅ (y) ≈ 1 holds, belongs to Q({LV n+1 , LV q+1 × LV 2 }). Therefore, let C be a critical MV-algebra satisfying the axiomatization. Then, C is such that C ∼ = LV m1+1 × · · · × LV mr+1 satisfying conditions of Theorem 4, and moreover for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, either m i |n or m i = q because C ∈ V({LV n+1 , LV q+1 }). If there is c ∈ C such that nq(c ∧ ¬c) = 1 then, by the second quasi-equation of the axiomatization above, γ {n},
If for every c ∈ C, nq(c ∧ ¬c) = 1 then m i = 1 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. In that case, by the characterization of critical algebras (Theorem 4), either
If 1 ≤ i, m ≤ n, by analogy with L i/n m , we define the matrix logic
Then we have the following generalization of Theorem 7.
Theorem 10. Let 0 < i ≤ n be natural numbers and let q be a prime number. Then we have:
is strongly maximal with respect to L i n , and it is axiomatized by H j/nq n,q plus the rule j(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)/γ j/nq n (ψ).
• If q r |n and q r+1 | n then, for every j such that
is strongly maximal with respect to L i n , and it is axiomatized by H j/nq n,q r+1 plus the rule j(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)/γ j/nq n (ψ).
Recall that in the above rules γ Finally, the last statement of this theorem follows from Theorem 8 and Theorem 2.
6 An application to ideal paraconsistent logics As mentioned in Example 3, Arieli et al. have introduced in [3] the concept of ideal paraconsistent logics. We recall here this notion.
Definition 4 (c.f. [3] ). Let L be a propositional logic defined over a signature Θ (with consecuence relation L ) containing at least a unary connective ¬ and a binary connective → such that:
(ii) → is an implication for which the deduction-detachment theorem holds
(ii) There is a presentation of CPL as a matrix logic L = A, {1} over the signature Θ such that the domain of A is {0, 1}, and ¬ and → are interpreted as the usual 2-valued negation and implication of CPL, respectively.
Then, L is said to be an ideal paraconsistent logic if it is maximal w.r.t. L , and every proper extension of L over Θ is not ¬-paraconsistent.
An implication connective satisfying the above condition (ii) will be called deductive implication in the rest of the paper. Thus, a ¬-paraconsistent logic L with a deductive implication is ideal if it is maximal w.r.t. CPL (presented over the signature Θ of L) and, if L is another logic over Θ properly containing L, with Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L(Θ) such that Γ L ϕ but Γ L ϕ, then the logic obtained from L by adding Γ/ϕ as an inference rule is not ¬-paraconsistent.
As already noticed, the logics L n i with i/n ≤ 1/2 are paraconsistent. In this section, using the results of the previous sections, we study the status of the logics L i n in relation to ideal paraconsistency. Namely, in the following subsection, we will show that the logics of the form L i q , where q is prime and i/q ≤ 1/2 are ideal paraconsistent, while in subsection 6.2 the special case of L 1 3 , renamed as J 4 , is analyzed in more detail.
The ideal paraconsistent logics L i q
By combining Proposition 1 with Corollary 2 we know a logic L i q is ¬-paraconsistent and maximal w.r.t. CPL, provided that q is prime and i/q ≤ 1/2. From now on we will assume this is the case when referring to a logic L In addition, by Lemma 3, we know there is a definable unary connective ∼ Therefore we have a large family of examples of ideal paraconsistent logics. In particular, for each prime q, all the logics in the set P C q+1 = {L i q : i < q/2} are (q + 1)-valued ideal paraconsistent logics. Moreover, if we consider "the more theorems a paraconsistent logic has, the more well-behaved is the logic" as a valid further criterion, then we can still refine the set P C q+1 . Indeed, if we denote by T h(L) the set of theorems of a logic L then, as noticed in Remark 2, we have the strict inclusions T h(
T h(CPL) whenever i > j. Therefore the logic J q+1 = L 1 q appears to be the "best" ideal logic in the set P C q+1 , 7 since it is the logic in that set having the biggest set of theorems from classical logic.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that all the paraconsistent logics of the form L Proof. Straightforward. 5 Namely, ∼ i q p = ¬λ i,q (p). 6 Strictly speaking, in this claim we implicitly assume that the signature of L i q has been changed by adding the definable implication ⇒ i q as a primitive connective. 7 We have chosen the name J q+1 to denote the logic L 1 q inspired in the 3-valued case, where the ideal paraconsistent logic J 3 coincides with L 1 2 .
6.2 The four-valued ideal paraconsistent logic J 4
As mentioned in Remark 3, we know from Theorem 4.3 in [8] that it is possible to obtain a standard (that is, without "global" inference rules) Hilbert calculus for a logic L i n for i < n from the usual one for L n+1 by using translations. However, the calculi obtained in this manner can lack an intuitive meaning since they are defined in terms of the implication connective → of L n+1 , that is naturally associated to the filter F 1 = {1} but not to the filter F i/n = {i/n, . . . , 1}, which is the one at work in L i n . Actually, the implication naturally associated to the filter F i/n is ⇒ i n , which was considered above, for which modus ponens (MP) and the deduction-detachament theorem hold.
In this section we focus on the particular case of the (ideal paraconsistent) logic J 4 = L 1 3 . J 4 can be considered as a generalization to four values of the paraconsistent 3-valued logic J 3 introduced by da Costa and D'Ottaviano in [20] and briefly mentioned in Example 2. For this logic a more natural signature Σ will be considered for describing it axiomatically in terms of a deductive implication connective (in the sense of Definition 4 item (ii)) and a unary connective * representing the square operation x ⊗ x, which can be seen as a kind of 'truth stresser' (see e.g. [26] ). A soundness and completeness result for this calculus proved by using a 'separation' technique for truth-values will be presented. Note that dealing with logics J q = L 1 q for a prime q > 3 appears to be much more complicated, and certainly it lies outside the scope of this paper.
The signature Σ that will be used in the rest of the section is given by two unary connectives * (square) and ¬ (negation), plus a binary connective ∨ for disjunction. Abusing the notation, we formally define next J 4 over this signature, and we will show later that it is an equivalent presentation of L Observe that ¬ is Lukasiewicz negation in LV 4 , while * x = x ⊗ x (with ⊗ being Lukasiewicz strong conjunction) and ∨ is the lattice join in LV 4 .
In this signature Σ the following derived connectives can be defined (as usual, the corresponding operators will be denoted using the same symbol):
It is easy to see that ∆ is Monteiro-Baaz Delta-operator) and ∼ is Gödel negation (∼x = 1 if x = 0, and 0 otherwise). Note that ∼ actually coincides with ∼ 1 3 , and thus ⇒ is nothing but ⇒ It is worth to remark that Lukasiewicz implication is definable from these operators in the following way:
Then, the following result follows easily: This means that the proposed operators over Σ constitute an alternative presentation of the algebra LV 4 underlying L 4 . Next we define an axiomatic system for J 4 .
Definition 6. The Hilbert calculus H 4 for the logic J 4 , defined over the signature Σ, is given as follows:
Axiom schemas: those of CPL over the signature {∨, ⇒, ∼} plus (Ax1) ¬∼α ⇒ α (Ax2) α ∨ ¬α (Ax3) ¬¬α ⇔ α (Ax4) ¬(α ∨ β) ⇒ ¬α (Ax5) ¬(α ∨ β) ⇒ ¬β (Ax6) ¬α ⇒ (¬β ⇒ ¬(α ∨ β)) (Ax7) * α ⇒ α (Ax8) * (α ∨ ¬α) (Ax9) * α ⇒ ∼ * ¬α (Ax10) * * α ⇔ ∼¬α (Ax11) ¬ * α ⇔ ¬α (Ax12) * (α ∨ β) ⇔ ( * α ∨ * β)
Inference rule:
Observe that, since (MP) is the only inference rule, H 4 satisfies the deductiondetachment theorem w.r.t. the implication ⇒: Γ ∪ {α} H4 β iff Γ H4 α ⇒ β, for every set of formulas Γ ∪ {α, β}. On the other hand, it can be proved that * (α ⇒ β) ⇒ ( * α ⇒ * β) is derivable in H 4 , which gives additional support to consider * as a truth stresser. Soundness of H 4 can be proved straightforwardly. (Soundness of H 4 ) . The calculus H 4 is sound w.r.t. J 4 , that is: Γ H4 ϕ implies that Γ J4 ϕ, for every finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
Proposition 8
In order to prove completeness, since H 4 is a finitary Tarskian logic, one can use the technique of maximal consistent sets of formulas. Indeed, for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, if Γ H4 ϕ then, by Lindenbaum-Los theorem, Γ can be extended to a maximal set Λ such that Λ H4 ϕ. We will call the set Λ maximal non-trivial with respect to ϕ in H 4 . Maximal sets w.r.t. a formula enjoy remarkable properties which directly follow from the axioms and rules of H 4 .
Proposition 9. Let Λ be a maximal set non-trivial with respect to ϕ in H 4 . Then, Λ is closed, i.e. for every formula ψ, Λ ψ iff ψ ∈ Λ. Moreover, for any formulas α and β the following conditions hold:
(1) α ∨ β ∈ Λ iff α ∈ Λ or β ∈ Λ; (2) α ∈ Λ iff ∼α ∈ Λ; (3) α ⇒ β ∈ Λ iff α ∈ Λ or β ∈ Λ; (4) α ∈ Λ implies ¬α ∈ Λ; (5) α ∈ Λ iff ¬¬α ∈ Λ; (6) ¬∼α ∈ Λ implies α ∈ Λ; (7) ¬(α ∨ β) ∈ Λ iff ¬α ∈ Λ and ¬β ∈ Λ; (8) * α ∈ Λ implies α ∈ Λ; (9) * (α ∨ β) ∈ Λ iff * α ∈ Λ or * β ∈ Λ; (10) * * α ∈ Λ iff ¬α ∈ Λ; (11) ¬ * α ∈ Λ iff ¬α ∈ Λ; (12) * α ∈ Λ iff * ¬α ∈ Λ.
Next we prove a Truth Lemma for H 4 .
Lemma 5 (Truth Lemma for H 4 ). Let Λ be a maximal set of formulas nontrivial with respect to ϕ in H 4 . Consider the following evaluation e Λ of propositional variables for J 4 :
1 iff γ ∈ Λ, and ¬γ ∈ Λ 2/3 iff γ ∈ Λ, ¬γ ∈ Λ, and * γ ∈ Λ 1/3 iff γ ∈ Λ, ¬γ ∈ Λ, and * γ ∈ Λ 0 iff γ ∈ Λ.
Then, (T) holds for every complex formula γ.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the complexity of the formula γ. If γ is atomic then (T) holds by hypothesis. Now, suppose (T) holds for every formula with complexity ≤ n (induction hypothesis -IH) and let γ be a formula with complexity n. In order to prove (T) from (IH) by analyzing all the possible cases (namely, γ = ¬α or γ = * α or γ = α ∨ β), each item of Proposition 9 should be used. 8 The details are left to the reader.
Theorem 11 (Completeness of H 4 ).
The calculus H 4 is complete w.r.t. J 4 , that is: Γ J4 ϕ implies that Γ H4 ϕ, for every finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
Proof. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} be a set of formulas in the language of J 4 such that Γ H4 ϕ. By Lindenbaum-Los, there exists a set Λ maximal non-trivial with respect to ϕ in H 4 such that Γ ⊆ Λ. Let e Λ be the evaluation defined as in the Truth Lemma 5. Then, it follows that e Λ (γ) ∈ F 1/3 iff γ ∈ Λ, for every formula γ. Therefore e Λ is an evaluation such that e Λ [Γ] ⊆ F 1/3 but e Λ (ϕ) = 0 since ϕ ∈ Λ, hence Γ J4 ϕ.
Recall that, from Theorem 7 and Remark 4, the Hilbert calculus H 4 obtained from H 4 by adding the explosion rule (exp 1 ) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ⊥ (see Definition 3) is the axiomatization of the (only) proper extension of H 4 which is strongly maximal w.r.t. CPL, and that is semantically characterized by the matrix logicJ 4 = A 4 × A 2 , F 1/3 × {1} , where A 2 is the Boolean algebra over {0, 1} in the signature Σ, where the operator * is defined as * x = x.
Conclusions
In this paper we have been concerned with the study of maximality and strong maximality conditions among finite-valued Lukasiewicz logics L i n with order filters as designated values. In particular, we have characterized the conditions under which a logic L i n is maximal w.r.t. CPL and its unique extensionL i n by an inference rule is strongly maximal w.r.t. classical logic. This allows us to show that, although they are not strongly maximal w.r.t. CPL, the logics L i n with n prime and i/n ≤ 1/2 are in fact ideal paraconsistent logics. Thus, they provide interesting and well-motivated examples of ideal paraconsistent logical systems which are (n + 1)-valued, in contrast with the (n + 2)-valued logics M n+2 presented in [3] and reproduced here in Example 3, whose definition is somewhat ad hoc.
As for future work, there are several interesting problems that we leave open in this paper. Concerning maximality, a natural question is how to obtain a stronger version of Theorem 1 which give us sufficient conditions to guarantee that a given matrix logic L 1 is strongly maximal w.r.t. another matrix logic L 2 . On the other hand, notice that the study of strong maximality developed in Section 5 was heavily based on results on the algebraic semantics associated to these systems by means of the Blok and Pigozzi's techniques. Thus, another interesting issue to be explored in future work is to obtain more examples of strong maximality for different families of algebraizable logics Another question raised here is the axiomatization of the ideal paraconsistent logics J q+1 for q > 3 in a "natural" signature containing a deductive implication. As it was shown in Subsection 6.2, the signature Σ = {∨, ¬, * } is suitable for the case q = 3. Moreover, besides being apt for axiomatizing J 4 = L 1 3 , it can be proved that the (non-paraconsistent) logic L 2 3 can also be axiomatized over Σ in a relatively simple way. Note that α ⇒ β = ¬α ∨ β defines a deductive implication in L The fact that Lukasiewicz implication is definable in Σ justifies the convenience of using that signature for dealing with the case q = 3. However, this property does not hold for any prime q > 3. Indeed, there are primes q in which Lukasiewicz implication of L q+1 cannot be defined over Σ, e.g. q = 17. The study of the fragments of L i q in the signature Σ is thus a different but closely related problem, which deserves future research.
